

POLS 8000
Thurs. 3:30-6:15 p.m.
Baldwin 302
Fall, 2006

Dr. Keith Dougherty
Office: Baldwin 408, (706) 542-2989
Office Hours: Tues, Thurs, 1:00-2:00 p.m.
dougherk@uga.edu
<http://www.arches.uga.edu/~dougherk/>

Strategy in Politics

This class introduces students to analytical models of political strategy -- otherwise known as rational choice theory. Our emphasis will be on how rational choice theory applies to domestic and international politics, but the material should be of interest to graduate students in economics, public affairs, sociology, law, and other social sciences. No prior knowledge of the subject is needed. However, I will assume that students have sufficient aptitude for abstract reasoning and enough high school algebra to move at a fairly quick pace. Required readings are followed by recommended readings to allow the go-getters to study in greater detail.

After a brief introduction, we will turn our attention to social choice theory and several of the conundrums that it presents. We will ask whether we can establish fair democratic procedures and if so, which procedures are the fairest. Is there a fundamental conflict between liberty and electoral democracy? In the second section of the course, students will be introduced to game theory and its application to the Cuban missile crisis, the seven weeks war, collective action problems, and voter turnout. Students will learn how to solve sequential and simultaneous games and get the smell of games with imperfect information. The third section of the course introduces students to the median voter theorem and how this model applies to studies of bicameralism, presidential veto power, and Downs theory of mass elections. We will then extend our single dimensional model to multiple dimensions and learn anomalies such as McKelvey's Chaos Theorem. These models will then be applied to vote trading in the Election of 1824 and veto players in parliamentary democracies. In the end, students should acquire a good introduction to the theory and applications of rational choice theory.

Grading

Your grade consists of three homework assignments, a book review, a paper outline, and a research paper. All of these assignments will be posted on WebCT (see electronic readings below for login information). They will not be handed out in class. The homework assignments will help you practice the analytical techniques introduced in class and help you understand the material. Each is worth 10% of your overall grade. The book review will allow you to delve into an application of game theory, or some collective action problem, and may be useful for your research paper. It is worth 20% of your grade and should be prepared "as if" you were planning to submit it to a journal. The paper outline should include a statement of your research question, an abstract, and an outline of your paper. This project will help you get started early. The remaining 45% of your grade will be reserved for a research paper roughly 15 to 20 pages in length -- depending on your topic. For your research paper, you may write on any "approved" topic directly related to the course. I will offer suggestions to get you started.

All academic work must meet the standards contained in "A Culture of Honesty." Students are responsible for informing themselves about these standards before performing academic work.

The penalties for academic dishonesty are severe and ignorance is not an acceptable defense. Also note that the course syllabus is a general plan for the course and that deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Percent of Grade</u>
HOMEWORK 1 (social choice)	Sept 14	10%
HOMEWORK 2 (game theory)	Oct 5	10%
BOOK REVIEW (application of game theory)	Nov 2	20%
RESEARCH PAPER OUTLINE	Nov 16	5%
HOMEWORK 3 (spatial voting)	Nov 30	10%
RESEARCH PAPER	Dec 8	45%

Make-ups

Book reports, papers, and homework assignments require research and/or a fair amount of analysis time. Please plan ahead to avoid turning them in late. **Late assignments will be lowered one letter grade for every *working day* they are late.** If an assignment is late, it would be a good idea to stick it under my office door (Baldwin 408) as soon as possible to avoid any unnecessary late penalties. Grades are lowered for every *working day* they are late, not every class day they are late. Please plan ahead.

Required Texts

We will read both theoretical and substantive works in this course which vary in length. Unlike most social science courses, you may have to read the works two or three times to comprehend the material. Use a pencil and paper to work out the logic behind the material as you read. It will help. Recommended readings may help you understand the material from a different angle, though they are typically more difficult than the required readings, cover more detail, or address a specific application.

I will assume that all students will have read the required readings prior to class and that you are professional enough to know the consequences of not attending class. If you miss a class, please obtain the notes from another student. I do not give them out. Remember, if you work hard and complete all the readings, this should be a very rewarding course.

The following required books can be purchased from the campus book store.

1. Sarri, Donald. 2001. *Decisions and Elections: explaining the unexpected*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2. Dixit, Avinash and Susan Skeath. 2004. *Games of Strategy, 2nd ed.* New York: W.W. Norton.
3. Stewart, Charles. 2001. *Analyzing Congress*. New York: W.W. Norton.
4. Electronic Readings. Anything marked with a **ER** is an electronic reading posted on WebCT. You can log into WebCT from <http://my.uga.edu/>. After logging in, click myWebCT and

choose POLS 8000. You will also find the syllabus, homeworks, handouts, and grades posted there.

Schedule of Topics and Readings

note: [+] = difficult, but technically correct.
[-] = easier to understand.
[&] = application to a substantive area.

I. INTRODUCTION

Aug 17 Introduction

Required:

Mueller, Dennis. 2003. "Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics," *Public Choice III*, pp. 657-662, **ER**.

II. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

Aug 24 Problems with Preference Aggregation

Required:

Saari, *Decisions and Elections*, Ch 1.

Recommended:

Miller, Nicholas. 1983. "Pluralism and Social Choice," *American Political Science Review*. 77 (3): 734-747 [-].

Riker, William. 1958. "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments." *American Political Science Review*. 52 (June): 349-366 [&, -].

Riker, William. 1988. *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*. New York: Waveland Press.

Aug 31 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Required:

Saari, *Decisions and Elections*, chapter 2 (part, pp. 21-56), chapter 6 (part, pp. 157-194).

Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*, chapter 3-4 (starred sections are totally optional. I left them in for those who are so inclined), **ER**.

Vickrey, "Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules," in *Rational Man and Irrational Society*, pp. 343-353, **ER**.

Recommended:

- Dardanoni, “A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem” *Social Choice and Welfare*, **ER** [+].
- Arrow, Kenneth. (1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: John Wiley and Sons [+].
- Kelley, Jerry S. 1978. *Arrow Impossibility Theorems*. New York: Academic Press [+].
- Mackie, Gerry. 2003. *Democracy Defended*. New York: Cambridge University Press [-].
- Saari, *Decisions and Elections*, chapter 3 (this is a long and fairly difficult chapter, but it is the key to Saari’s solution) [-].
- Sen, A. 1999. “The Possibility of Social Choice” *American Economic Review* 89: 349-378.

Sept 7 Liberty and Sen’s Liberal Paradox

Required:

- Sen, A.K. 1993. “Markets and Freedoms,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, (focus on pp. 522-527), **ER**.
- Sen, A.K. 1970. “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” *The Journal of Political Economy*, **ER**.
- Saari, *Decisions and Elections*, chapter 2 (pp. 56-67).

Recommended:

- List, Christian. 2004. “The Impossibility of a Paretian Republican? Some Comments on Pettit and Sen” *Economics and Philosophy*, 20(1): 65-87 [-].
- Risse, Mathias. 2001. “What to Make of the Liberal Paradox?” *Theory and Decision*, 50 (2): 169-96 [+].
- Saari, *Decisions and Elections*, chapter 7.
- Sen, A.K. 1976. “Liberty, Unanimity, and Rights,” *Economica*, 43(171): 217-245 [-].
- Vanhuyse, Pieter. 2000. “On Sen's Liberal Paradox and its Reception within Political Theory and Welfare Economics.” *Politics*, 20(1): 25 [-].

III. GAME THEORY

Sept 14 Games with Sequential Moves

Required:

- Dixit and Skeath, Ch 2, “How to Think About Strategic Games” and Ch 3, “Games with Sequential Moves.”

Recommended:

- Morrow, James. 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. New York: Princeton University Press, Ch 4 and Ch 5.
- Brams, Steven J. 1975. *Game Theory and Politics*. New York: Free Press [-].

Hamburger, Henry. 1978. *Games as Models of Social Phenomena*. New York: W.H. Freeman [-].

Luce, Duncan R. and Howard Raiffa. 1989. *Games and Decisions*. New York: Dover Publications Inc.

Sept 21 Games with Simultaneous Moves

Required:

Dixit and Skeath, Ch 4, "Simultaneous Move Games with Pure Strategies I"

Recommended:

Dixit and Skeath, Ch 5 and Ch 6 (particularly pp. 123-131 & 155-179).

Watson, Joel. 2002. *Strategy: an introduction to game theory*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.

Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. 1993. *Game Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [+].

Gibbons, Robert. 1992. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sept 28 Applications: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Seven Weeks War

Required:

Dixit and Skeath, Ch 14, "Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis."

Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce. 1990. "Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony," *World Politics*, 43(1): 28-52, **ER**.

Recommended:

Bates, Robert. 1998. "The International Coffee Organization: An International Institution" in Robert Bates et. al. Eds. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 194-230 [&, -].

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The War Trap*. New Haven: Yale University [&, -].

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason*. New Haven: Yale University Press [&].

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace" *The American Political Science Review*, 93 (4): 791-807 [&].

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 1993. "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis." *The American Political Science Review*, 87(4) 829-844 [&, +].

Nicholson, Michael. 1989. *Formal Theories in International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press [&].

Morrow, James. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(2): 270-297.

Morrow, James. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining" *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(4): 941-972.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1986. "Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement." *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(1): 87-112 [&].

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. New York: Cambridge University Press [& , -].

Oct 5 Step Goods and Voter Turnout

Required:

Cain, Michael C.J. and Keith L. Dougherty. 1999. "Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 11(2): 233-260, **ER**.

William H. Riker; Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" *The American Political Science Review*, 62 (1): 25-42, **ER**.

Knack, Stephen. 1992. "Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout" *Rationality and Society*, 4: 133 - 156. **ER**

Recommended:

Aldrich, John H. 1993. "Rational Choice and Turnout" *American Journal of Political Science*, 37 (1): 246-278.

Brennan, Geoffrey and Loren Lomasky. 1997. *Democracy and Decision: the pure theory of electoral preference*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Grafstein, Robert (2002) "What Rational Political Actors Can Expect," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 14(2): 139-165.

Heckelman, Jac. 1995. "The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates," *Public Choice*, 82: 107-124.

Jones, Philip and John Hudson (2000) "Civic Duty and Expressive Voting: Is Virtue Its Own Reward?" *Kyklos*, 53(1): 3-16.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

III. SINGLE DIMENSIONAL SPATIAL VOTING

Oct 12 The Median Voter Theorem

Required:

Stewart, *Analyzing Congress*, part Ch 1 (pp. 3-22).

Recommended:

Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger. 1997. *Analytic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gerald Strom. 1990. *The Logic of Lawmaking: a Spatial Theory Approach*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins [- , &].

Enelow, James and Melvin Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting*. New York: Cambridge: University Press [+].

Farquharson, Robin. 1969. *Theory of Voting*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Black, Duncan. 1951. *Theory of Committees and Elections*. London: William Hodge [-].

Oct 19 Application: Bicameralism and Presidential Veto Power

Required:

Stewart, *Analyzing Congress*, Ch 2.

Recommended:

Eskridge, William and John Ferejohn. 1992. "Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State" *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 8(1): 165-89.

Eavy, Cheryl L. and Gary J. Miller. 1978. "Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?" *American Political Science Review*. 78 (Dec): 719-733 [&, -].

Holcombe, James. 1989. "*The Median Voter model in Public Choice Theory, Public Choice* 61:115-125 [&].

Maltzman, Forrest, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 2000. *Crafting law on the Supreme Court: the collegial game*. New York: Cambridge University Press [&].

Morgan, Clifton. 1984. "A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly*, 28: 407-26 [&, -].

Segal, Jeffrey A., Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover. 1992. "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations," *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(1) 96-121.

Oct 26 No Class: Fall Break

Nov 2 Book Reports

Students present book reviews

Nov 9 Application: Downsian Model of Popular Elections

Required [Downs and Electronic Readings Below]:

Downs, Anthony 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy" *The Journal of Political Economy*, 65(2): 135-150, **ER**.

*The 1964 election (see web CT):

*The 1988 Election (see web CT):

*The 1992 Election (see web CT):

Recommended:

- Downs, Anthony (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row [&, -].
- Heckelman, Jac. 2004. "A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections," *Public Choice*, 118: 87-103.
- Riker, William. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *American Political Science Review*.76: 753-766 [&, -].
- Morton, Rebecca. 2006. *Analyzing Elections*. New York: W.W. Norton.

IV. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SPATIAL VOTING

Nov 16 **The Chaos Theorem & Empirical Estimates of Ideal Points**

Required:

- Stewart, *Analyzing Congress*, remainder Ch 1 (pp. 22-40).
- Poole, Keith. 2000. "Non-Parametric Unfolding of Binary Choice Data." *Political Analysis* 8: 211-237, **ER**.

Recommended:

- Feld, Scott, Bernard Grofman, and Nicholas Miller. 1989. "Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games" *Mathematical Computational Modeling*, 12(4/5): 405-416 [-].
- Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger. 1997. *Analytic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press -- Ch 3, "Two Dimensions" and Ch 4, "Multiple Dimensions: Weighted Euclidean Distance."
- Hinich, M.J. and Michael C. Munger. 1994. *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan [&].
- McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control." *Journal of Economic Theory*. 12: 472-84 [+].
- McKelvey, Richard. 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models." *Econometrica*. 47 (5): 1085-1112 [+].
- Poole, Keith T. 2005. *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting: Analytical Methods for Social Research*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science*. 29: 357-84 [+].

Nov 23 **No Class: Thanksgiving**

Nov 30 **Application: The Election of 1824 and Veto Players in Parliaments**

Required:

- Jenkins, Jeffery and Brian Sala. 1998. "The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824." *American Journal of Political Science*, 42 (4): 1157- 1179 [&], **ER**.
- Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis" *The American Political Science Review*, 93 (3): 591-608, **ER**.

Recommended:

- Andrews, Josephine. 2002. *When Majorities Fail The Russian Parliament, 1990–1993*. New York: Cambridge University Press [&].
- Döring, H. ed. 1995. *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 488-527.
- Jillson, Calvin and Rick K. Wilson. 1994. *Congressional dynamics: structure, coordination, and choice in the first American Congress 1774-1789*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press [&].
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice", *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13 (3, Aug) [& , -].
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1998. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press [&].
- Riker, William. 1984. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review*, 74: 432-458.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice." *Public Choice*. 37: 503-19 [&].
- Weingast, Barry and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1995. *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(3): 289-325.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: how political institutions work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.