"Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics," with Justin Moeller (working paper).

"The Optimal Quorum" (working paper).

"Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis," with Jac Heckelman (submitted).

"Voting for a Pareto Efficient Constitution," with Julian Edward (submitted).

"The Properties of Simple vs. Absolute Majority Rule: cases where absences and abstentions are important," with Julian Edward, Journal of Theoretical Politics (R&R).

"Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule," with Julian Edward, The Journal of Politics, forthcoming.

"Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, Public Choice, 2008, 136 (3-4): 293-313.

"An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited," with Jac Heckelman, The Journal of Economic History, 2007, 67(4): 829-48.

"A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, American Political Science Review, 2006, 100(2): 297-302.

"The Pareto efficiency and expected costs of k-majority rules," with Julian Edward, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2004, 3(2): 161-189.

"Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation," with Michael Cain, Public Choice, 1997, 90: 201-213.