Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
 

"Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics," with Justin Moeller (working paper).

"Supermajority Rule and Redistributive Policy: An Empirical Study of Legislative Behavior in the States" (working paper).

"Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis," with Jac Heckelman (submitted).

"Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule," with Julian Edward, The Journal of Politics, forthcoming.

"An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783," Social Science History, forthcoming.
   Also of interest is data on French Soldiers in Aid of the American Revolution.

"Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, Public Choice, 2008, 136 (3-4): 293-313.

"An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited," with Jac Heckelman, The Journal of Economic History, 2007, 67(4): 829-48.

"A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention," with Jac Heckelman, American Political Science Review, 2006, 100(2): 297-302.

"Defending the Articles of Confederation: a response to Sobel," Public Choice, 2001, 109: 141-148.

"Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation," with Michael Cain, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, 11(2): 233-260.

"Public Goods and Private Interests: An explanation for state compliance with federal requisitions, 1775-1789," in Jac Heckelman et. al. eds. Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1999.

"Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation," with Michael Cain, Public Choice, 1997, 90: 201-213.